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I. WINDOWS AND MIRRORS
Buzzers are big in New York City. Favored particularly by
smaller stores and boutiques, merchants throughout the city have
installed them as screening devices to reduce the incidence of robbery.
When the buzzer sounds, if the face at the door looks "desirable," the
door is unlocked. If the face is that of an "undesirable," the door
stays locked. Predictably, the issue of undesirability has revealed
itself to be primarily a racial determination. Although the buzzer sys-
tem was controversial at first, even civil rights organizations have
backed down in the face of arguments that the system is a "necessary
evil," ' that it is a "mere inconvenience" compared to the risks of
being murdered,2 that discrimination is not as bad as assault,3 and
that in any event, it is not all blacks who are barred, just "17-year-old
black males wearing running shoes and hooded sweatshirts." 4
* Associate Professor of Law, The City University of New York Law School at Queens
College.
1. Gross, When 'By Appointment' Means Keep Out, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1986, at BI,
col. 3.
2. Id.
3. Letter to the Editor from Michael Levin and Marguerita Levin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1987, at E32, col. 3 [hereinafter Letter to the Editor].
S4. Id.
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Two Saturdays before Christmas, I saw a sweater that I wanted
to purchase for my mother. I pressed my brown face to the store
window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance. A narrow-
eyed white youth who looked barely seventeen, wearing tennis sneak-
ers and feasting on bubble gum, glared at me, evaluating me for signs
that would pit me against the limits of his social understanding. After
about five seconds, he mouthed, "We're closed," and blew pink rub-
ber at me. It was one o'clock in the afternoon. There were several
white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for things for
their mothers.
I was enraged. At that moment I literally wanted to break all of
the windows in the store and take lots of sweaters for my mother. In
the flicker of his judgmental grey eyes, that saleschild had reduced my
brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to a sham-
bles. He had snuffed my sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there
was nothing I could do to snuff his, without simply making a specta-
cle of myself.
I am still struck by the structure of power that drove me into
such a blizzard of rage. There was almost nothing I could do, short of
physically intruding upon him, that would humiliate him the way he
humiliated me. No words, no gestures, no prejudices of my own
would make a bit of difference to him. His refusal to let me into the
store was an outward manifestation of his never having let someone
like me into the realm of his reality. He had no connection, no com-
passion, no remorse, no reference to me, and no desire to acknowl-
edge me even at the estranged level of arm's length transactor. He
saw me only as one who would take his money and therefore could
not conceive that I was there to give him money.
In this weird ontological imbalance, I realized that buying some-
thing in that store was like bestowing a gift: the gift of my commerce.
In the wake of my outrage, I wanted to take back the gift of my
appreciation, which my peering in the window must have appeared to
be. I wanted to take it back in the form of unappreciation, disrespect,
and defilement. I wanted to work so hard at wishing he could feel
what I felt that he would never again mistake my hatred for some sort
of plaintive wish to be included. I was quite willing to disenfranchise
myself in the heat of my need to revoke the flattery of my purchasing
power. I was willing to boycott this particular store, random white-
owned businesses, and anyone who blew bubble gum in my face again.
My rage was admittedly diffuse, even self-destructive, but it was
symmetrical. The perhaps loose-ended but utter propriety of that
rage is no doubt lost not just to the young man who barred me, but to
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those who appreciate my being barred only as an abstract precaution,
and who approve of those who would bar, even as they deny that they
would bar me.
The violence of my desire to have burst into that store is proba-
bly quite apparent to the reader. I wonder if the violence and the
exclusionary hatred are equally apparent in the repeated public urging
that blacks put themselves in the shoes of white store owners,5 and
that, in effect, blacks look into the mirror of frightened whites faces to
the reality of their undesirability; and that then blacks would "just as
surely conclude that [they] would not let [themselves] in under similar
circumstances."'
This article will consider how the rhetoric of increased privatiza-
tion, in response to racial issues, functions as the rationalizing agent
of public unaccountability, and ultimately, irresponsibility. My
emphasis will be more on the process of exclusion than on reiterating
the substantive literature of silenced voices, a body as great as the
history of this nation. I will analyze the language of lawmakers, offi-
cials, and the public in order to present racial discrimination-so per-
vasive yet so hard to prosecute, so active yet so unactionable-in a
new light. My concern is the need for new tools with which to con-
front issues such as discriminatory prosecution, prejudice as a silent
force in jury reallocation of the burden of proof, the adequacy of an
evidentiary system in which relevance and materiality are subjective
reflections of self-interested values, private assumptions about race
and class, and right and wrong as forces in the allocation and distribu-
tion of the resources for survival. To this end, I will examine two
cases: the death of Eleanor Bumpurs, an elderly black woman shot by
police in the Bronx, and the beating of three black men by white teen-
agers in the Howard Beach section of Queens.
The second purpose of this article is to examine racism as a
crime, an offense so deeply painful and assaultive as to constitute
something I call "spirit-murder." Society is only beginning to recog-
nize that racism is as devastating, as costly, and as psychically obliter-
ating as robbery or assault; indeed they are often the same. Racism
resembles other offenses against humanity whose structures are so
deeply embedded in culture as to prove extremely resistant to being
recognized as forms of oppression.7 It can be as difficult to prove as
5. Gross, supra note I.
6. Letter to the Editor, supra note 3. The fact that some blacks might agree with the
store owners, shows that some of us have learned too well the lessons of privatized self-hatred
and rationalized away the fullness of our public, participatory selves.
7. That the framework of society dictates the nature of an offense is not a recent
phenomenon:
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child abuse or rape, where the victim is forced to convince others that
he or she was not at fault, or that the perpetrator was not just "play-
ing around." As in rape cases, victims of racism must prove that they
did not distort the circumstances, misunderstand the intent, or even
enjoy it.
II. CRIMES WITHOUT PASSION
A. Eleanor Bumpurs and the Language of Lawmakers
On October 29, 1984, Eleanor Bumpurs, a 270-pound, arthritic,
sixty-seven year old woman, was shot to death while resisting eviction
from her apartment in the Bronx. She was $98.85, or one month,
behind in her rent.' New York City Mayor Ed Koch and Police
Commissioner Benjamin Ward described the struggle preceding her
demise as involving two officers with plastic shields, one officer with a
restraining hook, another officer with a shotgun, and at least one
supervising officer. All of the officers also carried service revolvers.
According to Commissioner Ward, during the course of the
attempted eviction Mrs. Bumpurs escaped from the restraining hook
Radical criminologists have traditionally'argued that the definition of offenses is
historically contingent, a function of the needs of the dominant class at any point
in history. Many activities that seem totally unexceptionable on their face (for
instance, hunting in England on medieval common grounds) turns into the
capital offense of poaching as the ascending bourgeoisie wants to consolidate its
control over land as a commercial factor of production and to proletarianize the
peasantry by denying it sources of sustenance other than wages for hired
work .... At the same time, as activities harmless to all but the rulers are
outlawed, obviously harm-causing activities that are routinely performed by the
dominant classes (e.g., spewing carcinogens into the air and water) tend to be
noncriminal or, even when criminalized (e.g., white-collar crimes like
embezzlement and price-fixing), punished trivially and rarely.
Kelman, The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 218 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
8. The tragedy of Eleanor Bumpurs was put in an ironic perspective by one citizen who
asserted:
What has not been made clear in discussion relating to this case is that Mrs.
Bumpurs was evicted on a default judgment of possession and warrant of eviction
issued without any hearing of any kind. She was never personally served
because, allegedly, she was not at home on the two occasions the process server
says he called. Since Mrs. Bumpurs did not appear in court to answer the
petition for her eviction, the default judgment for possession and warrant for her
eviction were signed by the Civil Court judge solely on the papers submitted.
From what we know now .... there is serious doubt about the validity of those
papers.
Only last year, in announcing the indictments of five process servers, the
Attorney General and the New York City Departments of Consumer Affairs and
Investigation issued a report on service of process in Civil Court, finding that at
least one-third of all default judgments were based on perjurious affidavits ....
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1987, at A26, col. 4.
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twice and wielded a knife that Commissioner Ward says was "bent"
on one of the plastic shields. At some point, Officer Stephen Sullivan,
the officer positioned farthest away from her, aimed and fired his shot-
gun. It is alleged that the blast removed half of her hand, so that,
according to the Bronx District Attorney's Office, "[I]t was anatomi-
cally impossible for her to hold the knife." 9 The officer pumped his
gun and shot again, making his mark completely the second time
around. "o
In the two and one-half year wake of this terrible incident, con-
troversy raged as to whether Mrs. Bumpurs ought to have brandished
a knife and whether the officer ought to have fired his gun. In Febru-
ary 1987, a New York Supreme Court justice found Officer Sullivan
not guilty of manslaughter." The case centered on a very narrow
issue of language pitted against circumstance. District Attorney
Mario Merola described the case as follows: "Obviously, one shot
would have been justified. But if that shot took off part of her hand
and rendered her defenseless, whether there was any need for a sec-
ond shot, which killed her, that's the whole issue of whether you have
reasonable force or excessive force."' 2 My intention in the following
analysis is to underscore the significant task facing judges and lawyers
in undoing institutional descriptions of what is "obvious" and what is
not, and in resisting the general predigestion of evidence for jury
consumption.
Shortly after Mr. Merola's statement, Officer Sullivan's attorney,
Bruce Smiry, expressed eagerness to try the case before a jury. 3 Fol-
lowing the heavily publicized attack in Howard Beach, however, he
favored a bench trial. In explaining his decision to request a nonjury
trial, he stated:
I think a judge will be much more likely than a jury to understand
the defense that the shooting was justified .... The average lay
person might find it difficult to understand why the police were
there in the first place, and why a shotgun was employed ...
Because of the climate now in the city, I don't want people perceiv-
ing this as a racial case.
14
Since 1984, Mayor Koch, Commissioner Ward, and a host of
9. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1987, at B2, col. 5.
10. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at BI, col. 2.
11. The case was not brought to trial until January, 1987. Initially, a grand jury indicted
Officer Sullivan for reckless manslaughter. Two lower courts rejected the indictment, but in
1986, the Court of Appeals of New York reversed and ordered a trial regarding the second
shot. Id.
12. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at B6, col. 3 (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1987, at B2, col. 3.
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other city officials repeatedly have described the shooting of Mrs.
Bumpurs as completely legal. 5 At the same time, Commissioner
Ward has admitted publicly that Mrs. Bumpurs should not have died.
Mayor Koch admitted that her death was the result of "a chain of
mistakes and circumstances" that came together in the worst possible
way, with the worst possible circumstances.' 6 Commissioner Ward
admitted that the officers could have waited for Mrs. Bumpurs to
calm down, and that they could have used teargas or mace instead of
gunfire. According to Commissioner Ward, however, these observa-
tions are made with hindsight. As to whether this shooting of a black
woman by a white police officer had racial overtones, he stated that he
had "no evidence of racism."17 Commissioner Ward pointed out that
he is sworn to uphold the law, which is "inconsistent with treating
blacks differently,"'" and that the shooting was legal because it was
within the code of police ethics.19 Finally, city officials have resisted
criticism of the police department's handling of the incident by
remarking that "outsiders" do not know all of the facts and do not
understand the pressure under which officers labor.
The root of the word "legal" is the Latin word lex, which means
law in a fairly concrete sense-law as we understand it when we refer
to written law, codes, and systems of obedience.20 The word lex does
not include the more abstract, ethical dimension of law that contem-
plates the purposes of rules and their effective implementation. This
latter meaning is contained in the Latin word jus, from which we
derive the word "justice."'" This semantic distinction is not insignifi-
cant. The word of law, whether statutory or judicial, is a subcategory
of the underlying social motives and beliefs from which it is born. It
is the technical embodiment of attempts to order society according to
a consensus of ideals. When society loses sight of those ideals and
grants obeisance to words alone, law becomes sterile and formalistic;
lex is applied withoutjus and is therefore unjust. The result is com-
15. Remarks of Benjamin Ward, Police Commissioner of New York City, at City
University of New York (CUNY) Law School (Nov. 1985) (audiotape on file at CUNY)
[hereinafter Ward].
16. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1984, at B3, col. I.
17. Id. Against this, it is interesting to note that in New York City, where blacks and
latinos account for close to half the population, -86.8% of police officers are white; 8.6% are
black; 4.5% Latino; and 0.1% Asian or American Indian." Fact Sheets on Institutional
Racism, Council on Interracial Books for Children, (January 1982).
18. Ward, supra note 15.
19. Raab, Ward Defends Police Actions in Bronx Death, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1984, § 1, at
27, col. I.
20. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 682 (1983).
21. Id. at 655.
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pliance with the letter of the law, but not the spirit. A sort of punitive
literalism ensues that leads to a high degree of thoughtless conform-
ity. This literalism has, as one of its primary underlying values,
order-whose ultimate goal may be justice, but whose immediate end
is the ordering of behavior. Living solely by the letter of the law
means living without spirit; one can do anything as long as it com-
ports with the law in a technical sense. The cynicism or rebellious-
ness that infects one's spirit, and the enthusiasm or dissatisfaction
with which one conforms is unimportant. Furthermore, this compli-
ance is arbitrary; it is inconsistent with the will of the conformer. The
law becomes a battleground of wills. The extent to which technical
legalism obfuscates and undermines the human motivations that gen-
erate our justice system is the real extent to which we as human
beings are disenfranchised.
Cultural needs and ideals change with the momentum of time;
redefining our laws in keeping with the spirit of cultural flux keeps
society alive and humane. In the Bumpurs case, the words of the law
called for nonlethal alternatives first, but allowed some officer discre-
tion in determining which situations are so immediately life endanger-
ing as to require the use of deadly force.22 This discretionary area was
presumably the basis for the claim that Officer Sullivan acted legally.
The law as written permitted shooting in general, and therefore, by
extension of the city's interpretation of this law, it would be impossi-
ble for a police officer ever to shoot someone in a specifically objec-
tionable way.
22. Laws requiring police officers to use nonlethal alternatives are prevalent in this
country.
[N]ationwide, a majority of the states have specific provisions governing the use
of deadly force. Approximately twenty-four states have codified the common-
law 'fleeing felon' rule under which a law enforcement officer is justified in using
deadly force in order to arrest any person suspected of committing any felony.
Primarily because of the considerable discretion inherent in the choice to use
deadly force, provisions of the Model Penal Code have called for state statutes
requiring the decision to use deadly force be based on the concern for immediate
public safety rather than the fact that a felony, in name only, has been
committed.
As a general proposition, efforts to control the use of deadly force have not
fared too well over time. For example, the Missouri legislature rejected the
suggestion of its advisory committee to limit the use of deadly force when he or
she 'reasonably believes' such force is necessary. Of the states evaluated, over
half dealt with the issue of the use of force, but few adhered to the standard of the
Model Penal Code concerning the police decision to use force. The approach of
the legislatures evaluated has to be described as one of maintaining extensive
discretion in the use of force-not of limiting it.
Williams, The Politics of Police Discretion, in DISCRETION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY 23 (C.
Pinkele & W. Louthan eds. 1985).
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If our laws are thus piano-wired on the exclusive validity of liter-
alism, if they are picked clean of their spirit, then society risks height-
ened irresponsibility for the consequences of abominable actions.
Accordingly, Jonathan Swift's description of lawyers weirdly and
ironically comes to life: "[T]here was a Society of Men among us,
bred up from their Youth in the Art of proving by words multiplied
for the Purpose, that White is Black and Black is White, according as
they are paid. To this Society all the rest of the People are Slaves."23
We also risk subjecting ourselves to such absurdly empty rhetoric as
Commissioner Ward's comments to the effect that both Mrs.
Bumpurs' death and racism were unfortunate, while stating "but the
law says .... "24 Commissioner Ward's sentiments might as well
read: "The law says ... and therefore the death was unfortunate but
irremediable; the law says ... and therefore there is little that can be
done about racism." The law thus becomes a shield behind which to
avoid responsibility for the human repercussions of both governmen-
tal and publicly harmful private activity.25
A related issue is the degree to which much of the criticism of the
police department's handling of this case was devalued as "noisy" or
excessively emotional. It is as though passionate protest were a sepa-
rate crime, a rudeness of such dimension as to defeat altogether any
legitimacy of content. We as lawyers are taught from the moment we
enter law school to temper our emotionalism and quash our idealism.
We are taught that heartfelt instincts subvert the law and defeat the
security of a well-ordered civilization, whereas faithful adherence to
the word of law, to stare decisis and clearly stated authority, would as
a matter of course lead to a bright, clear world like the Land of Oz, in
which those heartfelt instincts would be preserved. Form is exalted
over substance, and cool rationales over heated feelings. But we
should not be ruled exclusively by the cool formality of language or
by emotions. We must be ruled by our complete selves, by the intel-
lectual and emotional content of our words. Governmental represen-
tatives must hear the full range of legitimate concerns, no matter how
indelicately expressed or painful they may be to hear.
23. J. SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (1726).
24. Ward, supra note 15.
25. "Th[e] process of allowing the structures we ourselves have built to mediate relations
among us so as to make us see ourselves as performing abstract roles in a play that is produced
by no human agency is what is usually called . . . reification. It is a way people have of
manufacturing necessity: they build structures, then act as if (and genuinely come to believe
that) the structures they have built are determined by history, human nature, economic law."
Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 7, at 289;
see also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE
GUARDIANS? A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES (1981).
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But undue literalism is only one type of sleight of tongue in the
attainment of meaningless dialogue. Mayor Koch, Commissioner
Ward, and Officer Sullivan's defense attorneys have used overgeneral-
ization as an effective rhetorical complement to their avoidance of the
issues. For example, allegations that the killing was illegal and unnec-
essary, and should therefore be prosecuted, were met with responses
such as, "The laws permit police officers to shoot people."26 "As long
as police officers have guns, there will be unfortunate deaths. '2 7 "The
conviction rate in cases like this is very low."'2 8 The observation that
teargas would have been an effective alternative to shooting Mrs.
Bumpurs drew the dismissive reply that "there were lots of things
they could have done."29
Privatization of response as a justification for public irresponsi-
bility is a version of the same game. Honed to perfection by President
Reagan, this version holds up the private self as indistinguishable
from the public "duty and power laden" self. Public officials respond
to commentary by the public and the media as though it were meant
to hurt private, vulnerable feelings. Trying to hold a public official
accountable while not hurting his feelings is a skill the acquisition of
which would consume time better spent on almost any conceivable
task. Thus, when Commissioner Ward was asked if the internal
review board planned to discipline Officer Sullivan, many seemed dis-
posed to accept his response that while he was personally very sorry
she had died, he could not understand why the media was focusing on
him so much. "How many other police commissioners," he asked
repeatedly, "have gotten as much attention as I have?"3
Finally, a most cruel form of semantic slipperiness infused Mrs.
Bumpurs' death from the beginning. It is called victim responsibil-
ity.3 It is the least responsive form of dialogue, yet apparently the
26. Raab, supra note 19.
27. Id.; Ward, supra note 15.
28. This was part of the basis on which two lower courts had vacated the 1985 grand jury
indictment of Officer Sullivan, before it finally was reinstated in November, 1986, and the basis
on which the Police Benevolent Association protested Officer Sullivan's being tried at all. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at BI, col. 5.
29. Ward, supra note 15; see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1984, at B3, col. 1 '(Mayor Koch's
description of the Bumpurs incident).
30. Ward was the first black comissioner in the history of the New York City Police
Department. Compared to other responsible officials, he was subjected to a glaringly excessive
degree of scrutiny.
31. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at BI, col. 4. The hypothesized failure of Mrs. Bumpurs'
children to look after her actually became a major point in Officer Sullivan's defense attorney's
opening statement and closing argument. Ironically, "a former employee of the Housing
Authority said that, three weeks before Mrs. Bumpurs' death ... her relatives tried to make a
payment of about .. half of the rent she owed .. but the former Authority employee, Joan
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easiest to accept as legitimate.
All these words, from Commissioner Ward, from the Mayor's
office, from the media, and from the public generally, have rumbled
and resounded with the sounds of discourse. We want to believe that
their symmetrical, pleasing structure is the equivalent of discourse. If
we are not careful, we will hypnotize ourselves into believing that it is
discourse.
B. Howard Beach and the "Private Property" of Neighborhood
In the early morning hours of December 20, 1986, three young
black men left their stalled car on Cross Bay Parkway, in the New
York City borough of Queens, and went to look for help. They
walked into the neighborhood of Howard Beach, entered a pizzeria,
ordered pizzas, and sat down to eat. An anonymous caller to the
police reported their presence as "black troublemakers." A patrol car
came, found no trouble, and left. After the young men had eaten,
they left the pizzeria and were immediately surrounded by a group of
eight to ten white teenagers who taunted them with racial epithets.
The white youths chased the black men for about three miles, catch-
ing them at several points and beating them severely. One of the
black men died as a result of being struck by a car as he tried to flee
across a highway. Another suffered permanent blindness in one eye.32
In the extremely heated public controversy that ensued, as much
attention centered on the community of Howard Beach as on the
assailants themselves. A veritable Greek chorus formed, comprised of
the defendants' lawyers and resident after resident after resident of
Howard Beach, all repeating and repeating and repeating that the
mere presence of three black men in that part of town at that time of
night was reason enough to drive them out. "They had to be starting
trouble."33  "We're a strictly white neighborhood."34  "What were
they doing here in the first place?"35
Alfredson, . . . who was a bookkeeper, said she turned down the payment because she was
forbidden to accept partial payment without the written consent of a supervisor." Id.
32. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1987, at BI, col. 4.
33. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1986, at B4, col. 6.
34. Id.
35. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at B3, col. 3. The pinnacle of legitimacy to which this
particular question arose is, to me, the most frightening aspect of this case. For example, when
Mayor Koch was asked why he thought the young men were walking around Howard Beach,
he dignified the question with the following answer: "I don't know ... and neither did the 12
or so people who beat them. Because they didn't ask them. They didn't talk to them." Id.
One is left to speculate that if the attackers, these self-annointed gatekeepers, had asked and
gotten an answer like "none of your business" they then would have been entitled to beat and
attack in the fullness of public spirited zeal. One wonders further, what explanation really
[Vol. 42:127
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Although the immensely segregationist instincts behind such
statements may be fairly evident, it is worth making explicit some of
the presuppositions behind such ululations.
Everyone who lives here is white.
No black could live here.
No one here has a black friend.
No white would employ a black here.
No black is permitted to shop here.
No black is ever up to any good.
These presuppositions themselves are premised on lethal philosophies
of life.
1. "IT'S BETTER TO BE SAFE THAN SORRY"
"Are we supposed to stand around and do nothing while these
blacks come into our area and rob us?" 6 one woman asked a reporter
in the wake of the Howard Beach attack. A twenty year old, who had
lived in Howard Beach all of his life, said, "We ain't racial .... We
just don't want to get robbed."37 The hidden implication of these
statements is that to be safe is not to be sorry, and that to be safe is to
be white and to be sorry is to be associated with blacks. Safety and
sorrow, which are inherently alterable and random, are linked to inal-
terable essences. The expectation that uncertain conditions are really
immutable is a formula for frustration; it is a belief that feeds a sense
of powerlessness. The rigid determinism of placing in the disjunctive
things that are not in fact disjunctive is a set up for betrayal by the
very nature of reality. The national repetition that white neighbor-
hoods are safe and blacks bring sorrow is an incantation of powerless-
ness. And, as with the upside-down logic of all irrational
incantations, it imports a concept of white safety that almost necessar-
ily endangers the lives as well as the rights of blacks.
It is also an incantation of innocence and guilt, much related to
incantations that affirmative action programs allow presumably
"guilty" blacks to displace "innocent" whites.3 " (Even assuming that
"innocent whites" were being displaced by blacks, does that make
would have been a sufficient "open sesame" to allow young black males to continue
unmolested passage into-the sanctified byways of Howard Beach?
36. Village Voice, Jan. 6, 1987, at 16, col. 1.
37. Id.
38. Professor Richard Delgado has written extensively on how such analyses are used to
undercut affirmative action:
A 'we-they' analysis ... justifies a disadvantage that we (the majority) want to
impose on ourselves to favor them (the minority). This type of thinking, however,
leaves the choice of remedy and the time frame for that remedy in the hands of
the majority; it converts affirmative action into a benefit, not a right. It neglects
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blacks less innocent in the pursuit of education and jobs? If anything,
are not blacks more innocent in the scheme of discrimination?) In
fact, in the wake of the Howard Beach incident, the police and the
press rushed to serve the public's interest in the victims' unsavory
"guilty" dispositions. They overlook the fact that racial slurs and
attacks "objectif[y] people-the incident could have happened to any
black person who was there at that time and place. This is the crucial
aspect of the Howard Beach affair that is now being muddied in the
media. Bringing up [defendants' past arrest records] is another way
of saying, 'He was a criminal who deserved it.' " Thus, the game of
victim responsibility described above is itself a slave to society's ste-
reotypes of good and evil.
It does no good, however, to turn race issues into contests for
some Holy Grail of innocence. In my youth, segregation and antimis-
cegenation laws were still on the books in many states. During the
lifetimes of my parents and grandparents, and for several hundred
years before them, laws prohibited blacks from owning property, vot-
ing, and learning to read or write. Blacks were, by constitutional
mandate, outlawed from the hopeful, loving expectations that being
treated as a whole, rather than three-fifths of a human being can
bring. When every resource of a wealthy nation is put to such destruc-
tive ends, it will take more than a few generations to mop up the
mess.
40
the possibility that a disadvantaged minority may have a moral claim to a
particular remedy.
The inner-circle commentators rarely deal with issues of guilt and
reparation. When they do, it is often to attach responsibility to a scapegoat,
someone of another time or place, and almost certainly of another social class
than that of the writer. These writers tend to focus on intentional and
determinable acts of discrimination inflicted on the victim by some perpetrator
and ignore the more pervasive and invidious forms of discriminatory conditions
inherent in our society. This 'perpetrator' perspective deflects attention from the
victim-class, the Blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans who
lead blighted lives for reasons directly traceable to social and institutional
injustice.
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 570-71 (1984).
39. Reid, Visible Man, Village Voice, Jan. 6, 1987, at 15, col. 3.
40. In an interview with Alton Maddox and Vernon Mason, attorneys for the victims of
the Howard Beach attack, a reporter asked if "too much" was being made of this case:
Maddox: We've had too many murders, so you can never make too much
out of a case when you've seen too many other similar murders. What happens is
that the rage expands and it continues to expand as the establishment continues
to whitewash these cases ....
Mason: I think it is a tribute in a commemorative way, almost a memorial
way, that we have our dead who spiritually are rising up from their graves now-
Willie Turks, Michael Stewart, Eleanor Bumpurs, Darryl Dodson [all New
Yorkers killed in recent white-on-black violence] and so many other people over
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We have all inherited that legacy, whether new to this world or
new to this country. It survives as powerfully and invisibly reinforc-
ing structures of thought, language, and law. Thus, generalized
notions of innocence and guilt have little place in the struggle for
transcendence; there is no blame among the living for the dimension
of this historic crime, this national tragedy.4' There is, however,
responsibility for never forgetting one another's histories, and for
making real the psychic obliteration which lives on as a factor in
shaping relations, not just between blacks and whites,42 or blacks and
blacks,43 but also between whites and whites. Whites must consider
how much this history has projected onto blacks the blame for all
criminality, and for all of society's ills. It has become the means for
keeping white criminality invisible."
2."DISCRIMINATION DOESN'T HURT AS MUCH AS BEING
ASSAULTED" OR "A PREJUDICED SOCIETY IS BETTER
THAN A VIOLENT SOCIETY"
The attempt to split bias from violence has been this society's
most enduring and fatal rationalization. Prejudice does hurt, how-
ever, just as the absence of prejudice can nourish and shelter. Dis-
crimination can repel and vilify, ostracize and alienate. White people
the ages who have been the victims of injustice. We have had to live with all of
that. We have had to absorb all of that. There is something to be said about the
adage that if a Black person is not psychologically ill or paranoid, then
something's wrong with him. We've had to absorb all of that pain with no
justice.
We as a people have had to deal with a distorted, bizarre way of dealing
with our pain over a period of years. That rage that Alton was talking about, it
didn't disappear; people still remember. It expands.
City Sun, Jan. 7-13, 1987, at 7-8.
41. Delgado has stated:
Emphasizing utility or distributive justice as the justification for affirmative
action has a number of significant consequences. It enables the writer to
concentrate on the present and the future and overlook the past .... The past
becomes irrelevant; one just asks where things are now and where we ought to go
from here, a straightforward social-engineering inquiry. . . . But . . . it robs
affirmative action programs of their moral force in favor of a sterile theory of
fairness or utility. No doubt there is a great social utility to affirmative action,
but to base it solely on that ground ignores the right of minority communities to
be made whole, and the obligation of the majority to render them whole.
Delgado, supra note 36, at 570.
42. During a trip to Howard Beach that was to be his effort to promote racial harmony,
Mayor Koch asserted that "most robberies were committed by blacks .... N.Y. Times, Dec.
29, 1986, at B3, col. 5.
43. Mayor Koch went on, moreover, to reassure his all-white audience that "most of the
victims were black, too." Id.
44. Id.; see supra note 43.
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who do not believe this should try telling everyone they meet that one
of their ancestors was black. I had a friend in college who having
lived her life as a blonde, grey eyed white person, discovered that she
was one-sixteenth black. She began to externalize all the unconscious
baggage that "black" bore for her: the self-hatred that is racism. She
did not think of herself as a racist (nor had I) but she literally wanted
to jump out of her skin, shed her flesh, and start life over again. She
confided in me that she felt "fouled" and "betrayed." She also asked
me if I had ever felt this way. Her question dredged from some deep
corner of my suppressed memory the recollection of feeling precisely
that, when at the age of three or so, some white playmates explained
to me that God had mixed mud with the pure clay of life in order to
make me.
In the Vietnamese language, "the word T (toi) ... means 'your
servant'; there is no T as such. When you talk to someone, you estab-
lish a relationship."4 Such a concept of "self" is a way of experienc-
ing the other, ritualistically sharing the other's essence, and
cherishing it. In our culture, seeing and feeling the dimension of
harm that results from separating self from "other" requires more
work. 46 Very little in our language or our culture encourages or rein-
forces any attempt to look at others as part of ourselves. With the
imperviously divided symmetry of the marketplace, social costs to
blacks are simply not seen as costs to whites,47 just as blacks do not
share in the advances whites may enjoy.
45. D. BERRIGAN & T. NHAT HANH, THE RAFT IS NOT THE SHORE 38 (1975).
46. Lacan wrote:
Who, if not us, will question once more the objective status of this 'I', which a
historical evolution peculiar to our culture tends to confuse with the subject?
This anomaly should be manifested in its particular effects on every level of
language, and first and foremost in the grammatical subject of the first person in
our languages, in the 'I love' that hypostatizes the tendency of a subject who
denies it. An impossible mirage in linguistic forms among which the most
ancient are to be found, and in which the subject appears fundamentally in the
position of being determinant or instrumental of action.
Let us leave aside the critique of all the abuses of the cogito ergo sum, and
recall that, in my experience, the ego represents the center of all the resistances to
the treatment of symptoms. It was inevitable that analysis, after stressing the
reintegration of the tendencies excluded by the ego, in so far as they are subjacent
to the symptoms that it tackled in the first instance, and which were bound up for
the most part with the failures of Oedipal identification, should eventually
discover the 'moral' dimension of the problem.
J. LACAN, Aggressiyity in Psychoanalysis, in ECRITS: A SELECTION 23-24 (1977).
47. The starkest recent example of this has been the disastrous delay in responding to the
AIDS epidemic; as long as AIDS was seen as an affliction affecting Haitians, Hispanics,
Africans and other marginalized groups such as intravenous drug users and homosexuals, its
long-term implications were ignored. Health Experts Fault US. on Response to AIDS, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at A20, col. 1.
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This structure of thought is complicated by the fact that the dis-
tancing does not stop with the separation of the white self from the
black other. In addition, the cultural domination of blacks by whites
means that the black self is placed at a distance even from itself, as in
the example of blacks being asked to put themselves in the position of
the white shopkeepers who view them.48 So blacks are conditioned
from infancy to see in themselves only what others who despise them
see.
49
It is true that conforming to what others see in us is every child's
way of becoming socialized. 50 It is what makes children in our society
seem so gullible, so impressionable, so "impolitely" honest, so blindly
loyal, and so charming to the ones they imitate.5 Yet this conformity
also describes a way of being that relinquishes the power of independ-
ent ethical choice. Although such a relinquishment can have quite
desirable social consequences, it also presumes a fairly homogeneous
social context in which values are shared and enforced collectively.
Thus, it is no wonder that western anthropologists and ethnogra-
phers, for whom adulthood is manifested by the exercise of independ-
ent ethical judgment, so frequently denounce tribal cultures or other
collectivist ethics as "childlike."
By contrast, our culture constructs some, but not all, selves to be
the servants of others. Thus, some "I's" are defined as "your ser-
vant," some as "your master." The struggle for the self becomes not a
true mirroring of self-in-other, but rather a hierarchically-inspired
series of distortions, where some serve without ever being served,
some master without ever being mastered, and almost everyone hides
from this vernacular domination by clinging to the legally official defi-
nition of"'I" as meaning "your equal."
In such an environment, relinquishing the power of individual
ethical judgment to a collective ideal risks psychic violence, an oblit-
eration of the self through domination by an all powerful other. In
such an environment, it is essential at some stage that the self be per-
mitted to retreat into itself and make its own decisions with self-love
and self-confidence. What links child abuse, the mistreatment of
48. See Letter to the Editor, supra note 3.
49. See generally K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965); K. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR
CHILD (1955); J. COMER & A. POUSSAINT, BLACK CHILD CARE (1975); W. GRIER & P.
COBBS, BI.ACK RAGE (1968).
50. See generally Selznick, Law, Society and Moral Evolution, in READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 931, 947-49 (P. Shuchman ed. 1979).
51. "[T]h'e Oedipal identification is that by which the subject transcends the aggressivity
that is constitutive of the primary subjective individuation. I have stressed elsewhere how it
constitutes a step in the establishment of that distance by which, with feelings like respect, is
realized a whole affective assumption of one's neighbur [sic]." Lacan, supra note 46, at 23.
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women, and racism is the massive external intrusion into psyche that
dominating powers impose to keep the self from ever fully seeing
itself.52 Because the self's power resides in another, little faith is
placed in the true self, that is, in one's own experiential knowledge.
Consequently, the power of children, women and blacks is actually
reduced to the "intuitive," rather than the real; social life is necessar-
ily based primarily on the imaginary.53  Furthermore, because it is
difficult to affirm constantly with the other the congruence of the
self's imagining what the other is really thinking of the self, and
because even that correlative effort is usually kept within very limited
family, neighborhood, religious, or racial boundaries, encounters
cease to be social and become presumptuous, random, and
disconnected.
This peculiarly distancing standpoint allows dramas, particularly
racial ones like Howard Beach, to unfold in scenarios weirdly unre-
lated to the incidents that generated them. At one end of the spec-
trum is a laissez faire response that privatizes the self in order to
remain unassailably justified. At the other end is a pattern that gener-
alizes individual or particular others into terrifyingly uncontrollable
"domains" of public wilderness, against which proscriptive barriers
must be built to protect the eternally innocent self.
a. Privitizing Innocence
The prototypical scenario of the privatized response is as follows:
Cain: Abel's part of town is tough turf.5 4
52. See generally A. MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD (1984).
53. An example relevant to the development of 'legal reification' can be found in
any first grade classroom. It is 8:29 and children are playing, throwing food, and
generally engaging in relatively undistorted communication. At 8:30 the teacher
* . . calls the class to attention: it is time for the 'pledge of allegiance.' All face
front, all suffer the same social rupture and privation, all fix their eyes on a
striped piece of cloth. As they drone on, having not the slightest comprehension
of the content of what they are saying, they are nonetheless learning the sort of
distorted or reified communication that is expressed in the legal form. They are
learning, in other words, that they are all abstract 'citizens' of an abstract 'United
States of America,' that there exists 'liberty and justice for all,' and so forth -
not from the content of the words, but from the ritual which forbids any
rebellion. Gradually, they will come to accept these abstractions as descriptive of
a concrete truth because of the repressive and conspiratorial way that these ideas
have been communicated (each senses that all the others 'believe in' the words
and therefore that they must be true), and once this acceptance occurs, any
access to the paradoxically forgotten memory that these are mere abstractions
will be sealed off. And once the abstractions are reified, they can no longer be
criticized because they signify a false concrete.
Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 25, 26-27.
54. The following newspaper account describes an encounter between Mayor Koch and a
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Abel: It upsets me when you say that; you have never been to my
part of town. As a matter of fact, my part of town is a leading
supplier of milk and honey.55
Cain: The news that I'm upsetting you is too upsetting for me to
handle. You were wrong to tell me of your upset because now I'm
terribly upset.5 6
Abel: I felt threatened first. Listen to me. Take your distress as a
measure of my own and empathize with it. Don't ask me to recant
and apologize in order to carry this conversation further.57
This type of discourse is problematic because Cain's challenge in
calling Abel's turf "tough" is transformed into a discussion of the care
with which Abel challenges that statement. While there is certainly
an obligation to be careful in addressing others the obligation to pro-
tect the feelings of those others gets put above the need to protect
one's own. The self becomes subservient to the other, with no reci-
procity, and the other becomes a whimsical master. Abel's feelings
are deflected in deference to Cain's, and Abel bears the double burden
of raising his issue properly and of being responsible for its impact on
Cain. Cain is rendered unaccountable for as long as this deflection
continues because all the fault is assigned to Abel. Morality and
responsiveness thus become dichotomized as Abel drowns in responsi-
bility for valuative quality control, while Cain rests on the higher
ground of a value neutral zone.
Caught in conversations like this, blacks as well as whites will
black congregation in Jamaica, Queens: "In discussing the Howard Beach incident, Mr. Koch
asked the people in Morning Star [Baptist Missionary Church] whether, if three white men
were walking in Harlem after midnight, 'do you believe they would be absolutely safe?' "
" 'Yes,' the congregation chorused. The Mayor did not think so, but said he was glad
they did." N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at B3, col. 6.
In reading this, I had trouble discerning the Mayor's motivation in asking such a
question. Was the Mayor implying that blacks would support racial violence if it occurred in
reverse? If, as the story implies, Koch thought the congregation would say 'no,' what he then
would have "shown" is that racism is just human nature after all; that public absolution is
simply a matter of pointing a finger and wailing "well you did it too"; and that death in "turf
wars--or over eviction notices-isn't really racism, but just part of life.
55. Rev. Dr. Timothy Mitchell, pastor of Ebenezer Missionary Baptist Church stated,
"What happened to Michael Griffith [who was killed in the Howard Beach incident] can
happen to any of us .... The issue is whether we are free to walk around in our city and be
seen and accepted and protected as God's children." N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at B3, col. 1.
56. Dr. Gerald Schulze, a physician at Coney Island Hospital stated, "I don't want to
continue to hear Howard Beach is a hotbed of racial violence because it isn't." N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1986, at B4, col. 4.
57. When Alan Hendrickse, the leader of the mixed race chamber of the South African
Parliament, decided to go swimming at a "whites only" beach, President Botha demanded that
he either apologize or resign, or he would "have no choice but to dissolve the Parliament ....
When he started marching in on the beach, he embarrassed me and broke the rules of
Parliament .... It is a question of procedure." N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at A3, col. 6.
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feel keenly and pressingly circumscribed. Perhaps most people never
intend to be racist, oppressive, or insulting. Nevertheless, by describ-
ing zones of vulnerability and by setting up fences of rigidified polite-
ness, the unintentional exile of individuals as well as races may be
quietly accomplished.
b. Publicizing Guilt
Another scenario of distancing self from the responsibility for
racism is the invention of some great public wilderness of others. In
the context of Howard Beach, the specter against which the self must
barricade itself is violent: seventeen year old, black males wearing
running shoes and hooded sweatshirts. It is this fear of the uncontrol-
lable, overwhelming other that animates many of the more vengefully
racist comments from Howard Beach, such as, "We're a strictly white
neighborhood.... They had to be starting trouble. '5 8
These statements set up angry, excluding boundaries. They also
imply that the failure to protect and avenge is bad policy, bad states-
manship, and an embarrassment. They raise the stakes beyond the
unexpressed rage arising from the incident itself. Like the Cain and
Abel example, the need to avenge becomes a separate issue of protocol
and etiquette-not a loss of a piece of the self, which is the real cost of
real tragedies, but a loss of self-regard. By self-regard, I do not mean
self-concept as in self-esteem; I mean that view of the self that is
attained by the self stepping outside the self to regard and evaluate the
self. It is a process in which the self is watched by an imaginary
other, a self-projection of the opinions of real others, where "I" means
"your master" and where the designated other's refusal to be domi-
nated is felt as personally assaultive. Thus, the failure to avenge is felt
as a loss of self-regard. It is a psychological metaphor for whatever
trauma or original assault that constitutes the real loss to the self.59 It
is therefore more abstract, more illusory, more constructed, and more
invented. Potentially, therefore, it is less powerful than "real" assault,
in that with effort it can be unlearned as a source of vulnerability.
This is the real message of the attempt to distinguish between preju-
dice and violence: names, as in the old "sticks and stones" ditty,
58. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1986, at B4, col. 6.
59. "Inner rage tends to burn out our connections to the real world. It tends to overwhelm
reason and to destroy the faces and beings of others. In our anger we can only see ourselves.
The inability to imagine the experience of the stranger, of the other, was exactly what made the
Holocaust possible. The Nazi success in dehumanizing their victims has left us with such rage
that we too can dehumanize, erase the individual faces of others. We must find a way to let
our anger burn freely, openly without consuming or perverting ...otherwise we remain
victims forever." Roiphe, The Politics of Anger, I TIKKUN 18, 22 (1986).
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although undeniably and powerfully influential, can be learned or
undone as motivation for future destructive action.6" As long as they
are not unlearned, however, the exclusionary power of such free-float-
ing emotions makes its way into the gestalt of prosecutorial and jury
decisions and into what the law sees as crime, or as justified, provoked
or excusable.61 Law becomes described and enforced in the spirit of
our prejudices.62
3. THE EVIDENTIARY RULES OF LEGITIMATING TURF WARS
The following passage is a description of the arraignment of three
of the white teenagers who were involved in the Howard Beach
beatings:
The three defense lawyers also tried to cast doubt on [the prosecu-
tor's] account of the attack. The lawyers questioned why the vic-
tims walked all the way to the pizza parlor if, as they said, their
mission was to summon help for their car, which broke down three
miles away .... At the arraignment, the lawyers said the victims
passed two all-night gas stations and several other pizza shops
before they reached the one they entered.
60. Professor Robert Cover discussed the relation of "name-calling" to the power of the
judiciary as follows:
The judge in imposing a sentence normally takes for granted the role structure
which might be analogized to the 'transmission' of the engine of justice. The
judge's interpretive authorization of the 'proper' sentence can be carried out as a
deed only because of these others; a bond between word and deed obtains only
because a system of social cooperation exists. That system guarantees the judge
massive amounts of force-the conditions of effective domination-if necessary.
It guarantees-or is supposed to-a relatively faithful adherence to the word of
the judge in the deeds carried out against the prisoner .... If the institutional
structure-the system of roles-gives the judge's understanding its effect, thereby
transforming understanding into 'law,' so it confers meaning on the deeds which
effect this transformation, thereby legitimating them as 'lawful.' A central task
of the legal interpreter is to attend to the problematic aspects of the integration of
role, deed, and word, not only where the violence (i.e., enforcement) is lacking
for meaning, but also where meaning is lacking for violence.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1619 (1986).
61. Id. at 1629.
62. In describing the degree to which subway gunman Bernhard Goetz was made a folk
hero after he shot four young black men, Kenneth Clark stated:
There is no question that society must be protected from those who assault, rob
or otherwise violate others. These forms of lawless behavior must be punished.
But they cannot be punished constructively by the lawlessness of another
individual. Frustration, fear and outrage afflict both the rejected and the
'respectables.' This common predicament blurs the boundaries between the
lawful and the lawless. As a society adjusts to, or rewards, its accepted cruelties
and continues to deny their consequences, it makes heroes of lawless
'respectables' and in so doing develops a selective form of moral indignation and
outrage as a basis for the anomaly of a civilization without a conscience.
Clark, In Cities, Who [s the Real Mugger? N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
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A check yesterday of area restaurants, motels and gas stations
listed in the Queens street directory found two eating establish-
ments, a gas station and a motel that all said they were open and
had working pay phones on Friday night.
A spokesman for the New York Telephone Company, Jim
Crosson, said there are six outdoor pay telephones.., on the way
to the pizzeria.63
In the first place, lawyers must wonder what relevance this has.
Does the answer to any of the issues the defense raised serve to prove
that these black men assaulted, robbed, threatened or molested these
white men? Does it even prove that the white men reasonably feared
such a fate? The investigation into the number of phone booths per
mile does not reveal why the white men would fear the black men's
presence. Instead, it is relevant to prove that there is no reason a black
man should walk or just wander around the community of Howard
Beach. This is not semantic detail; it is central to understanding bur-
densomeness of proof in such cases. It is this unconscious restructur-
ing of burdens of proof into burdens of white over black that permits
people who say and who believe that they are not racist to commit
and condone crimes of genocidal magnitude. It is easy to rationalize
this as linguistically technical, or as society's sorrow. As one of my
students said, "I'm so tired of hearing the blacks say that society's
done them wrong." Yet these gyrations kill with their razor-toothed
presumption. Lawyers are the modern wizards and medicine people
who must define this innocent murderousness as crime.
Additionally, investigations into "closer" alternatives eclipse the
possibility of other explanation. They assume that the young men
were not headed for the subway (which was in fact in the same direc-
tion as the pizzeria), and further, that black people must have docu-
mented reasons for excursioning into white neighborhoods and out of
the neighborhoods to which they are supposedly consigned.
It is interesting to contrast the implicit requirement of documen-
tation imposed on blacks walking down public streets in Howard
Beach with the implicit license of the white officers who burst into the
private space of Mrs. Bumpurs' apartment. In the Bumpurs case,
lawmakers consistently dismissed the availability of less intrusive
options as presumption and idle hindsight.64 This dismissal ignored
the fact that police officers have an actual burden of employing the
least harmful alternatives. In the context of Howard Beach, however,
such an analysis invents and imposes a burden on nonresidents to stay
63. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1986, at B4, col. 6.
64. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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out of strange neighborhoods. It implies harm in the presence of
those who do not specifically "own" something there. Both analyses
skirt the propriety and necessity of public sector responsibility. Both
redefine public accountability in privatized terms. Whether those
privatized terms act to restrict or expand accountability is dichoto-
mized according to the race of the actors.
Finally, this factualized hypothesizing was part of a news story,
not an editorial. "News," in other words, was reduced to hypothesis
based on silent premises: they should have used the first phone they
encountered; they should have eaten at the first "eating establish-
ment;" they should have gone into a gas station and asked for help;
surely they should have had the cash and credit cards to do any of the
above or else not travel in strange neighborhoods. In elevating these
to relevant issues, however, The New York Times did no more than
mirror what was happening in the courtroom.
4. THE APPROPRIATION OF PSYCHIC PROPERTY
In an ill-fated trip to the neighborhood of Jamaica, in the bor-
ough of Queens, Mayor Koch attempted to soothe tensions by asking
a congregation of black churchgoers to understand the disgruntle-
ment of Howard Beach residents about the interracial march by 1400
protesters through "their" streets. He asked them how they would
feel if 1400 white people took to the streets of the predominantly
black neighborhood of Jamaica.65 This remark, from the chief execu-
tive of New York City, accepts and even advocates a remarkable
degree of possessiveness about public streets. This possessiveness,
moreover, is racially rather than geographically bounded. In effect,
Koch was pleading for the acceptance of the privatization of public
space. This is the de facto equivalent of segregation. It is exclusion in
the guise of deep-moated private property "interests" and "values."
In such a characterization, the public nature of the object of discus-
sion, the street, is lost.
66
Mayor Koch's question suggests that 1400 black people took to
the streets of Howard Beach. In fact, the crowd was integrated-
blacks, browns, and whites, residents and nonresidents of Howard
Beach. Apparently, crowds in New York are subject to the unwritten
equivalent of Louisiana's race statutes (which provide that 1/72 black
65. See supra note 35 and accompanying text..
66. Walt Whitman recognized a world in which nature knows no boundaries:
I guess [the grass] is a uniform hieroglyphic, And it means, Sprouting alike in
broad zones and narrow zones, Growing among black folks as among white.... I
give them the same, I receive them the same.
W. WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 39 (1977).
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ancestry renders a person black) and to the Ku Klux Klan's "contam-
ination by association" standard ("blacks and white-blacks" was how
one resident of Forsythe County, Georgia described an interracial
crowd of protesters there).
On the other hand, if Mayor Koch intended to direct attention to
the inconvenience, noise, and pollution of such a crowd in those small
streets, then I am sympathetic. My sympathy is insignificant, how-
ever, compared to my recognition of the necessity and propriety of the
protestors' spontaneous, demonstrative, peaceful outpouring of rage,
sorrow, and pain.
If, however, Mayor Koch intended to ask blacks to imagine 1400
angry white people descending on a black community, then I agree, I
would be frightened. This image would also conjure up visions of
1400 hooded white people burning crosses, 1400 Nazis marching
through Skokie, and 1400 cavalry men riding into American Indian
lands. These visions would inspire great fear in me, because of the
possibility of grave harm to the residents. But there is a difference,
and that is why the purpose of the march is so important. That is
why it is so important to distinguish mass protests of violence from
organized hate groups that openly threaten violence. By failing to
make this distinction, Mayor Koch created the manipulative specter
of unspecified mobs sweeping through homes in pursuit of vague and
diffusely dangerous ends. From this perspective, he appealed to
thoughtlessness, to the pseudoconsolation of hunkering down and
bunkering up against the approaching hoards, to a glacially
overgeneralized view of the unneighborhooded "public" world.
Moreover, the Mayor's comments reveal that he is ignorant of
the degree to which the black people have welcomed, endured, and
suffered white marchers through their streets. White people have
always felt free to cruise through black communities and to treat them
possessively. Most black neighborhoods have existed only as long as
whites have permitted them to exist. Blacks have been this society's
perpetual tenants, sharecroppers, and lessees. Blacks went from being
owned by others, to having everything around them owned by others.
In a civilization that values private property above all else, this effec-
tuates a devaluation of humanity, a removal of blacks not just from
the market, but from the pseudospiritual circle of psychic and civic
communion. As illustrated in the microcosm of my experience at the
store,67 this limbo of disownedness keeps blacks beyond the pale of
those who are entitled to receive the survival gifts of commerce, the
67. The microcosm to which I am referring is the experience of being excluded, not that of
not being able to get into that store per se.
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property of life, liberty, and happiness, whose fruits our culture places
in the marketplace. In this way, blacks are positioned analogically to
the rest of society, exactly as they were during slavery or Jim Crow.6 8
There is a subtler level to the enactment of this dispossession.
The following story may illustrate more fully what I mean: Not long
ago, when I first moved back to New York after some twenty years, I
decided to go on a walking tour of Harlem. The tour, which took
place on Easter Sunday, was sponsored by the New York Arts Soci-
ety, and except for myself, was attended exclusively by young, white,
urban, professional, real estate speculators. They were pleasant look-
ing, with babies strapped to their backs and balloons in their hands.
They all seemed like very nice people.
Halfway through the tour, the guide asked the group if they
wanted to "go inside some churches." The guide added, "It'll make
the tour a little longer, but we'll probably get to see some services
going on . . . Easter Sunday in Harlem is quite a show." A casual
discussion ensued about the time that this excursion might take.
What astonished me was that no one had asked the people in the
churches if they minded being stared at like living museums. I won-
dered what would happen if a group of blue-jeaned blacks were to
walk uninvited into a synagogue on Passover or St. Anthony's of
Padua in the middle of High Mass. Just to peer, not pray. My over-
whelming instinct is that such activity would be seen as disrespectful.
Apparently, the disrespect was invisible to this well-educated,
affable group of people. They deflected my observations with com-
ments such as, "We just want to look"; "No one will mind"; "There's
no harm intended." As well intentioned as they were, I was left with
the impression that no one existed for them whom their intentions
could not govern.69 Despite the lack of apparent malice in their
demeanor,7" it seemed to me that to live so noninteractively is a liabil-
68. It is in understanding the degree to which black buying power is nevertheless a
sustaining component in even the strongest white economies that reveals the logic behind the
controversial boycott of white-owned businesses, called for by some black leaders in the wake
of Howard Beach. Rev. Calvin 0. Butts 3d of the Abyssinian Baptist Church said, "We're
talking about getting the kind of respect that comes from the power of our vote and our buying
power." N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at B3, col. 4.
69. For an analysis that elevates precisely this thinking to normative principles of "good
intentions" in the law, see Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation
Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 156 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041
(1978).
70. Professor Charles Lawrence aptly described this lack of malice in the following:
It is common for racial minorities, especially those who find themselves relatively
isolated in predominantly white institutions, to have white colleagues express
stereotyped or derogatory views either by way of direct statements or by unstated
but implicit assumptions. . . . It is obvious to the minority person that the
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ity as much as a luxury. To live imperviously to one's impact on
others is a fragile privilege, which depends ultimately on the inability
of others to make their displeasure known.
III. THE GIFT OF INTELLIGENT RAGE
A. Owning the Self in a Disowned World
Reflecting on Howard Beach brought to mind a news story from
my fragmentary grammar school recollections of the 1960's: a white
man acting out of racial motives killed a black man who was working
for some civil rights organization or cause. The man was stabbed
thirty-nine times, a number which prompted a radio commentator to
observe that the point was not just murder, but something beyond.
What indeed was the point, if not murder? I wondered what it
was that would not die, which could not be killed by the fourth, fifth,
or even tenth knife blow; what sort of thing that would not die with
the body but lived on in the mind of the murderer. Perhaps, as psy-
chologists have argued, what the murderer was trying to kill was a
part of his own mind's image, a part of himself and not a real other.
After all, statistically and corporeally, blacks as a group are poor,
powerless, and a minority. It is in the minds of whites that blacks
become large, threatening, powerful, uncontrollable, ubiquitous, and
supernatural.
There are certain societies that define the limits of life and death
very differently than our own. For example, death may occur long
before the body ceases to function, and under the proper circum-
stances, life may continue for some time after the body is carried to its
grave.7" These non-body-bound, uncompartmentalized ideas recog-
nize the power of spirit, or what we in our secularized society might
describe as the dynamism of self as reinterpreted by the perceptions of
speaker has not intended a racial slight-his tone is friendly and candid-and
that he is unaware of the attitudinal source of the inadvertent derogation. And
when other whites are present, they are unlikely to hear or be sensitive to the
connotations of the demeaning remark.
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 341, n.100.
71. Death under these circumstances is, in the mythology of most cultures, associated with
some sort of initiatory transformation. Shamanism, fraternities and Christianity thus all share
elements of suffering, death, and resurrection.
[T]he same symbolism occurs again in the Buddhist tradition: the monk gives up
his family name and becomes a 'son of Buddha'... because he is 'born among the
saints.' . . . But this initiatory birth implied death to profane existence .... [I]n
Hinduism as well as in Buddhism ... the yogi 'dies to this life' to be reborn into
another mode of being, that which is represented by 'liberation.'
M. ELIADE, MYTHS, DREAMS AND MYSTERIES 227 (P. Mairet trans. 1975).
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other.72 These ideas comprehend the fact that a part of ourselves is
beyond the control of pure physical will and resides in the sanctuary
of those around us. A fundamental part of ourselves and of our dig-
nity is dependent upon the uncontrollable, powerful, external observ-
ers who constitute society.73 Surely a part of socialization ought to
include a sense of caring responsibility for the images of others that
are reposited within us.74
Taking the example of the man who was stabbed thirty-nine
times out of the context of our compartmentalized legal system, and
considering it in the hypothetical framework of a legal system that
encompasses and recognizes morality, religion, and psychology, I am
moved to see this act as not merely body murder but spirit-murder as
well. I see it as spirit-murder, only one of whose manifestations is
racism-cultural obliteration, prostitution, abandonment of the eld-
erly and the homeless, and genocide are some of its other guises. I see
spirit-murder as no less than the equivalent of body murder.
One of the reasons that I fear what I call spirit-murder, or disre-
gard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard, is that
its product is a system of formalized distortions of thought. It pro-
duces social structures centered around fear and hate; it provides a
72. Such ideas are found in many cultures othat than our own:
In the West, the loss of the sense of self.., is often regarded as a sign of madness,
but in India the loss of the sense of Self... as distinct from God ... is the key to
enlightenment....
Because they move as far away as possible from the terrifying brink of
solipsism, Indians tend to rush to the other extreme of attributing an external
reality to the internal mental constructions of other people .... In this way, it is
possible to get gobbled up by dragons that other people believe in.
W. O'FLAHERTY, DREAMS, ILLUSION AND OTHER REALITIES 121 (1984).
73. Creating a self-identity through the eyes of others is not a new phenomenon:
[AII the sociologists of the 'primitive mind' busy themselves around this
profession of identity, which, on reflexion [sic], is no more surprising than
declaring, 'I'm a doctor' or 'I'm a citizen of the French Republic', and which
certainly presents fewer logical difficulties than the statement, 'I'm a man', which
at most can mean no more than, 'I'm like he whom I recognize to be a man, and
so I recognize myself as being such.' In the last resort, these various formulas are
to be understood only in reference to the truth of 'I is an other', an observation
that is less astonishing to the intuition of the poet than obvious to the gaze of the
psychoanalyst.
J. LACAN, Aggresivity in Psychoanalysis, in ECRITS: A SELECTION, supra note 46, at 23.
74. Lacan permits us to explore the relations between the unconscious and human society.
One way of describing his work is to say that he makes us recognize that the
unconscious is not some kind of seething, tumultuous, private region 'inside' us,
but an effect of our relations with one another. The unconscious is, so to speak,
'outside' rather than 'within' us-or rather it exists 'between' us, as our
r elationships do.
T. EAGLETON, LITERARY CRITICISM 173 (1983).
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tumorous outlet for feelings elsewhere unexpressed. 75  For example,
when Bernhard Goetz shot four black teenagers in a New York City
subway, an acquaintance of mine said that she could understand his
fear because it is a "fact" that blacks commit most crimes. What
impressed me, beyond the factual inaccuracy of this statement,76 was
the reduction of Goetz' crime to "his fear," which I translate to mean
her fear. The four teenage victims became all blacks everywhere, and
"most crimes" clearly meant that most blacks commit crimes.
In the process of devaluing its image of black people, the general
white population seems to have been socialized to blind itself to the
horrors inflicted by white people. One of the clearest examples of the
mechanics of this socialized blindness is the degree to which the pub-
lic and the media in New York repeatedly and relentlessly bestialized
Goetz' victims. Images of the urban jungle, of young black men fill-
ing the role of "wild animals," were favorite journalistic construc-
tions. Young white urban professionals were mythologized, usually
wrapped in the rhetorical apparel of lambs or sheep, as the tender,
toothsome prey. 7 The corollary to such imagery is that the fate of
those domesticated white innocents is to be slaughtered in confronta-
tion, the dimensions of which thus become meaninglessly and tragi-
cally sacrificial. 78 Locked into such a reification, no act of the sheep
against the wolves can ever be seen as violent in its own right, because
active sheep are so inherently uncharacteristic, so brave, so irresistibly
and triumphantly parabolic. Thus, when prosecutor Gregory Waples
cast Goetz as a "hunter" in his final summation, juror Michael Axel-
75. "Undoubtedly, something that is not expressed does not exist. But the repressed is
always there-it insists, and it demands to come into being. The fundamental relation of man
with this symbolic order is precisely the same one which founds this symbolic order itself-the
relation of non-being to being." Lacan, Sign, Symbol, Imaginary, in ON SIGNS 209 (M.
Blonsky ed. 1985).
76. In 1986, whites were arrested for 71.7% of all crimes; blacks and all other races
accounted for the remaining 28%. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 300 (T.
Flanagan & K. Jamieson eds. 1986). Furthermore, there is evidence that "whites commit
more crimes, and that white offenders have consistently lower probabilities of arrest than do
either blacks or Mexican-Americans. This is particularly striking for armed robbery and
burglary." J. PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 44
(1983). "Controlling for the factors most likely to influence sentencing and parole decisions,
the analysis still found that blacks and Hispanics are less likely to be given probation, more
likely to receive prison sentences, more likely to receive longer sentences, and more likely to
serve longer time." Id. at xxiv.
77. A typical example of this was the front page story of the New York Post of June 15,
1987, two days before the jury returned a verdict which cleared Goetz of all but illegal gun
possession. The article, excoriating the prosecutor's office for even bringing the case, ran under
an enormous heading referring to the victims as "predators."
78. Black attempts to invert this imagery have been logical but largely lost efforts. See,
e.g., Flake, 'Blacks Are Fair Game, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1987, at A35, col. 3.
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rod said that Waples "was insulting my intelligence. There was noth-
ing to justify that sort of [characterization]. Goetz wasn't a
hunter."
79
Furthermore, most white people do not seem to feel as criminal
the dehumanizing cultural images of sterile, mindless white woman-
hood and expressionless, bored but righteous, assembly line white
manhood.8 ' For example, although it is difficult to document in any
scientific way, I think many whites do not expect other whites to
rape, rob, or kill them.8' They are surprised when it happens. Per-
haps they blind themselves to the warning signals of approaching
assault. Some do not even recognize it when it does happen; they
apologize for the assailant, think it must have been their fault; they
misperceived the other's intent.8 2
The following vignette may better illustrate what I mean:
A lone black man was riding in an elevator in a busy downtown
department store. The elevator stopped on the third floor and a
crowd of noisy white high school students got on. The black man
took out a gun and shot as many of them as he could before the
doors opened on the first floor ... the rest fled for their lives. The
black man later explained to the police that he could tell from the
students' "body language," from their "shiny eyes and big smiles,"
79. N.Y. Newsday, June 17, 1987, at 5, col. 2.
80. The short stories of Joyce Carol Oates and Raymond Carver often present characters
who provide the prototype of what I mean. They describe people of warmth, compassion and
variety trapped in lives whose permitted limits flatten them like the roles of a situation
comedy. These people adjust their exteriors to required expectations, but every now and then
the repressed passion flares in sometimes wonderful, but more often destructive or self-
destructive ways. See R. CARVER, WILL YOU PLEASE BE QUIET, PLEASE? (1978); J. OATES,
MARRIAGES AND INFIDELITIES (1972).
81. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, fifty-four percent of violent crimes are
committed by friends, acquaintances or relatives of the victims. "In the last four years, fewer
than half, or 46 percent, of reported violent crimes were committed by complete
strangers .. " N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at A24, col. 1. A most tragic example of this is the
strangulation death in Central Park of college student Jennifer Levin. If public response is a
measure of anything at all, what fueled the fascination with that case was the fact that David
Chambers, the socialite who allegedly killed her, wasn't supposed to be the type of person who
robbed, raped or murdered. Such typology interferes with a lot of people seeing a lot of reality.
See Riley, An Aggressive Defense-or 'Obscene' Quest? NAT'L L.J., April 13, 1987, at I.
82. In a now famous videotape, Bernhard Goetz described to police in New Hampshire his
intention to inflict as much harm as he could. He detailed his wish to see his victims dead; said
that if he had to do it over again, he'd do the same or worse, and expressed a retrospective
desire to gouge their eyes out. Yet in finding him "not guilty" of each of twelve counts of
attempted murder, assault and reckless endangerment, the jury entirely discounted this
confession. "We felt he said a lot of things he was unsure about. He had nine days of thinking
about what happened and reading newspapers, and combined with the guilt, we felt that he
may have gotten confused. His own confusion coupled with his feelings of guilt might have
forced him to make statements that were not accurate." N.Y. Times, April 30, 1987, at B6,
col. 2
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that they wanted to "play with him, like a cat plays with a mouse."
Furthermore, the black man explained, one of the youths had tried
to panhandle money from him and another asked him, "How are
you?" "That's a meaningless thing," he said in his confession, "but
in certain circumstances, that can be a real threat." He added that
a similar greeting had preceded the vicious beating of his father, a
black civil rights lawyer in Mississippi, some time before. He con-
fessed that he intended to murder the high school students.
My guess is that most white Americans would view the severe
contextual misapprehensions of the black gunman as a form of serious
insanity. Although degrees of sympathy might vary, I suspect that
the social consensus would be nearly unanimous that he presents a
danger to himself and to others and should therefore be institutional-
ized or imprisoned. The above story is, however, with minor charac-
ter alteration, consistent with a videotaped confession by Bernhard
Goetz.83 Nevertheless, the public overwhelmingly presumed Goetz
innocent. Most accounts did not propose that he be institutionalized,
but pointed instead to the failure of public institutions to engage in
more such punitive activities. Bernhard Goetz' defense blatantly
reflected this consensus in its claim, not that Goetz was temporarily
insane, but rather that he acted reasonably under the circumstances.8
4
It is reflected as well in the degree to which the public devoured, ex
post facto, stories about the deviant behavior of the victims in this
case. 5 Goetz became a cited authority and favorite interviewee on
the subject of crime in New York. "Criminals," he declared, must
realize that being shot is a "risk they are going to have to take."86 I
can think of no better example of the degree to which criminality has
become lodged in a concept of the black "other."
If Americans are subject to such utter emotional devastation, it is
no wonder that the urge to act as a victimizer is so irresistible; it
83. Id.
84. See Fletcher, Goetz: Crazed Gunman or Good-Guy Defender?, L.A. Times, May 17,
1987, § V, at 1, col. 4; Restak, The Fiction of the Reasonable Man, Wash. Post, May 17, 1987,
at C3, col. 1.
85. The criminal propensities of Goetz' victims-ranging from allegations of rape to
robbery-were used not just in the context of whether deadly force should have been used
defensively, but were used to show why the four young men deserved to be the objects of his
intent to kill. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1987, at BI, col. 5. (Imagine in the case of the black
gunman in the elevator, a public inquiry that focused attention on any prior racist statements
of the white high schoolers, on their history of drinking and driving, on how they treated their
girlfriends, on whether any of them had ever shoplifted and whether they were only in the
department store to do so again. Imagine what might have happened if the black men in the
Howard Beach case, even after the first few beatings, had decided to "defend" themselves by
pulling guns and shooting repeatedly, to kill.).
86. L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1987, Part I, at 4, col. 3.
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appears to be the only right thing, the only defensible thing to do. It
is no wonder that society has created in blacks a class of ready-made,
prepackaged victims. To discount as much violence as we do in this
society must mean that we have a very angry population suppressing
explosive rage. Most white Americans, at least those in urban areas,
have seen the angry, muttering "lunatic" black person who beats the
air with his fists and curses aloud. Most people cross the street to
avoid him; they don't choose him to satisfy their need to know the
time of day. Yet for generations, and particularly in the wake of the
foaming public response to incidents like Howard Beach, the Goetz
shooting,8" and Forsythe County, that is precisely how white America
has looked to many black Americans.
For these reasons, I think we need to elevate what I call spirit-
murder to the conceptual, if not punitive level of a capital moral
offense."a We need to see it as a cultural cancer; we need to open our
eyes to the spiritual genocide it is wreaking on blacks, whites, and the
abandoned and abused of all races and ages. We need to eradicate-its
numbing pathology before it wipes out what precious little humanity
we have left.
B. Mirrors and Windows
The night after the Bumpurs story became public, I dreamed,
about a black woman who was denied entry to a restaurant because of
her color. In response, she climbed over the building. The next time
she found a building in her way, she climbed over it, and the next time
and the next and the next. In time, she became famous, as she
roamed the world, traveling in determined straight lines, wordlessly
scaling whatever lay in her path, including skyscrapers. Well-mean-
ing white people came to marvel at her and gathered in crowds to
watch and applaud. She never acknowledged their presence, but went
about her business in unsmiling silence. The white people grew angry
and condemned her for failing to appreciate their praise and rejecting
their gift of her fame. I stood somewhere on the periphery of this
dream and wondered what unspoken rule, what deadened curiosity
kept anyone from ever asking why.
87. There is a doorway on East 13th Street in New York City that for months had a huge
piece of brown paper taped to it, and the legend "Goetz" written across it. It reminded me of
the banners hung in windows for the parades of astronauts and other heroes. In fact, a parade
was all that the Goetz hoopla lacked to make it into a proper festive event. After delivering
their verdict, "defense attorney Nark Baker said the jurors asked for and received Bernhard
Goetz' autograph on their jury certificates." N.Y. Newsday, June 17, 1987, at 40, col. 2.
88. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and
Natne-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
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Upon waking, I asked myself a progression of "why's" about the
Bumpurs death. My life experiences had prepared me better to com-
prehend and sympathize with the animating force behind the out-
raged, dispossessed knifewielding of Mrs. Bumpurs.89 What I found
more difficult to focus on was the "why," the animus that inspired
such fear, and such impatient contempt in a police officer that the
presence of six other heavily armed men could not allay his need to
kill a sick old lady fighting off hallucinations with a knife. It seemed
to me a fear embellished by something beyond Mrs. Bumpurs herself;
something about her enlarged to fill the void between her physical,
limited presence and the "immediate threat and endangerment to life"
that filled the beholding eyes of the officer. Why was the sight of a
knife-wielding woman so fearfully offensive to a shotgun-wielding
policeman that he felt that blowing her to pieces was the only
recourse, the only way to preserve his physical integrity? What offen-
sive spirit of his past experience raised her presence to the level of a
physical menace beyond real dimensions? What spirit of prejudgment
and of prejudice provided him with such a powerful hallucinogen?
However slippery these questions may be on a legal or conscious
level, unresponsiveness to them does not make these issues go away.
Failure to resolve the dilemma of racial violence merely displaces its
power. The legacy of killing finds its way into cultural expectations,
archetypes, and "isms." The echoes of both dead and deadly others
acquire a hallucinatory quality; their voices speak of an unwanted
past, but also reflect for us images of the future. Today's world con-
demns those voices as superstitious and paranoid. Neglected, they
speak from the shadows of such inattention, in garbles and growls, in
the tongues of the damned and the insane. The superstitious listen,
and perhaps in the silence of their attention, they hear and under-
stand. So-called enlightened others who fail to listen to the voices of
demonic selves, made invisibly uncivilized, simply make them larger,
more barbarously enraged, until the nearsightedness of looking glass
89. I know few blacks who have not had some encounter with police intimidation. My
earliest remembrance of such an instance was when I was about nine and my sister was about
seven. My family was driving to Georgia to see my father's relatives. Two highway patrolmen
stopped our car on a deserted stretch of highway in South Carolina. They were attracted to
the Massachusetts license plate, and they wanted to know what "y'all" were doing in those
parts. They inquired about the weather in Boston, they fondled my father's driver's license
with great curiosity and they admired the lines of the car. They were extremely polite, their
conversation a model of southern hospitality and propriety. Throughout the entire fifteen or
twenty minutes of our detention, one officer questioned my mother and father in soothing,
honeyed tones; the other held a double-barreled shotgun through the rear window, pointed at
my sister and me. If he had "accidently" shot us both, our deaths would have been, like that
of Eleanor Bumpurs, entirely legal in the state of South Carolina.
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existence is smashed in upon by the terrible dispossession of dreams
too long deferred.
